Filed 5/7/19 In re L.A.R. CA2/7

## NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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## IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

## SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

## **DIVISION SEVEN**

In re L.A.R. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JOSE LUIS R.,

Defendant and Appellant.

B288734 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 18CCJP00781)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

In March 2018 the juvenile court sustained a petition filed by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1), finding true the Department's allegations that then eight-year-old L.A.R. and three-year-old L.R. came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court because of their father's drug use and their parents' violent altercations. The court removed the children from their father, Jose Luis R., placed them with their mother, and ordered monitored visits for Jose Luis. Jose Luis filed this appeal, challenging only the juvenile court's jurisdiction findings and asserting he did not seek custody of the children, only visitation with them.

In November 2018, while Jose Luis's appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction and entered a custody order awarding sole legal and physical custody of the children to their mother and ordering monitored visits for Jose Luis. In light of these rulings, we informed the parties of our intention to dismiss the appeal as moot unless Jose Luis established, by written submission, the appeal should not be dismissed as moot. Jose Luis filed a letter brief, arguing we should not dismiss the appeal as moot because the jurisdiction findings "could affect decisions to file any future dependency petitions against him" and "could compromise his position in any family law action that might arise."

"As a general rule, an order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction renders an appeal from a previous order in the dependency proceedings moot." (*In re C.C.* (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488.) And here, upon terminating jurisdiction, the juvenile court granted Jose Luis what he sought, namely, visitation with the children. (Jose Luis does not

These rulings are set forth in minute orders dated October 30, 2018 and November 2, 2018. We take judicial notice of the orders under Evidence Code sections 452, subdivision (d), and 459.

challenge the part of the juvenile court's order requiring monitored visitation, nor does he argue his appeal is not moot because he seeks unmonitored visitation.) Because we cannot grant Jose Luis any effective relief, his appeal is moot. (See *In re* N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 58-59 ["[a]n appellate court will dismiss an appeal when an event occurs that renders it impossible for the court to grant effective relief"]; *In re E.T.* (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 426, 436 ["[a]n appeal may become moot where subsequent events, including orders by the juvenile court, render it impossible for the reviewing court to grant effective relief," but ""[a]n issue is not moot if the purported error infects the outcome of subsequent proceedings""].) The speculative collateral consequences Jose Luis identifies in his letter brief do not warrant deviating from the general rule that an order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction moots an appeal from a previous order in the dependency proceedings. (See *In re I.A.*) (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1495.) Therefore, we dismiss the appeal as moot.

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PERLUSS, P. J.

SEGAL, J.

FEUER, J.